Can a Centrist Successor Prevent the Rise of the Far Right in France?
As Emmanuel Macron's presidency progresses, France faces a crowded and contentious race to find his successor. According to the Financial Times, the competition to replace Macron is increasingly crowded, reflecting a fragmented political landscape where traditional party lines have blurred.
This political volatility raises a critical question about the future of French democracy. The Guardian reports that France currently has a record number of presidential hopefuls, prompting debate over whether any centrist or mainstream candidate possesses the momentum to hold back the surging influence of the far right. Simultaneously, Macron continues to reshape France's global image, seeking foreign policy alliances that move away from the country's colonial legacy, as noted by recent Africa summit reports.
Given the current political climate, is the 'Macronist' centrist model a sustainable bulwark against political extremism, or has it inadvertently accelerated the rise of the far right by hollowing out the traditional center-left and center-right?
Step‑by‑step analysis
-
What the “Macronist” centrist model actually is
- Ideologically, it blends liberal‑market economics, pro‑European integration, and a socially progressive (but not left‑wing) stance on issues such as gender equality, secularism, and climate.
- Institutionally, it relies on a personal‑leadership party (La République En Marche! / Renaissance) that draws technocrats, business figures, and disaffected members of the old Socialist (PS) and Republican (LR) establishments.
-
Immediate electoral effects (2017‑2022)
- The model succeeded in displacing both PS and LR from the second round of the 2017 presidential election, capturing roughly 24 % of the first‑round vote and then winning the runoff with 66 %.
- In the 2022 legislative elections, Macron’s coalition lost its absolute majority, forcing reliance on ad‑hoc alliances with centrist and right‑leaning deputies—signalling that the party’s base is increasingly fragile.
-
Why the centrist model can act as a bulwark
- Strategic positioning: By occupying the political centre, it denies the far right a clear “mainstream” alternative to rally disaffected voters who fear economic instability or immigration.
- Institutional gatekeeping: Macron’s control of the presidency and ability to call snap elections (as in 2022) lets him frame the contest as a choice between stability (centrism) and chaos (far‑right populism).
- Policy moderation: Pro‑business reforms paired with limited social safety‑net expansions (e.g., the “activity bonus”) aim to alleviate the socioeconomic grievances that far‑right parties exploit.
-
How the same model may have accelerated far‑right growth
- Hollowing out traditional parties: The PS and LR have lost their core constituencies to Macron’s movement, leaving them organizationally weak and ideologically incoherent. Their inability to present a clear left‑or‑right alternative pushes disillusioned voters toward the far right, which now offers a simple, anti‑establishment narrative.
- Perceived elitism: Macron’s technocratic, top‑down style (e.g., pension reform via article 49.3, heavy reliance on executive orders) fuels a perception that the centrist elite is detached from ordinary citizens—a key far‑right recruiting point.
- Policy backlash: Reforms perceived as favoring capital (labor law liberalisation, wealth‑tax cuts) have intensified economic anxiety among lower‑income groups, a demographic the far right successfully courts with protectionist rhetoric.
- Fragmentation of the centre: The proliferation of centrist‑leaning lists (Horizons, MoDem, allied independents) dilutes a unified centrist message, making it harder to present a clear alternative to far‑right populism.
-
Empirical indicators
- In the 2022 presidential first round, Marine Le Pen (RN) secured 23.1 %—just shy of Macron’s 27.8 %—while the traditional left (Jean‑Luc Mélenchon) garnered 22 %. The combined centre‑left/centre‑right vote (PS+LR+centrist allies) fell below 30 %, a historic low.
- Polls from late 2023‑early 2024 show RN consistently polling between 28‑32 % for the next presidential election, while Macron’s projected successor (often cited as Édouard Philippe or a similar centrist figure) hovers around 20‑22 %—suggesting the centrist bloc is losing ground.
-
Conditional outlook
- If a centrist successor can (a) rebuild a broad coalition that re‑engages disaffected PS and LR voters, (b) pair pro‑growth reforms with visible, targeted social measures (e.g., housing, vocational training), and (c) avoid the perception of elitist technocracy by adopting more participatory decision‑making, then the centrist model retains a viable chance to act as a bulwark.
- If the current trajectory continues—personalised leadership, policy drift toward business interests, and a fragmented centre—then the far right is likely to keep gaining ground, as the vacuum left by the weakened traditional parties will be filled by populist nationalism.
Conclusion
The Macronist centrist model is not inherently doomed nor inherently destructive; its effectiveness hinges on its ability to translate electoral success into a durable, inclusive coalition that addresses both economic anxieties and cultural concerns. Without such adaptation, the centrist project risks becoming a transitional phase that, by eroding the old centre‑left/centre‑right duopoly, unintentionally fuels the very far‑right surge it seeks to contain.
The sustainability of the 'Macronist' centrist model as a bulwark against the far right is a subject of significant analytical debate. The data suggests it has been a successful short-term electoral tactic but may prove to be a flawed long-term strategy that has structurally altered French politics in favor of the extremes.
The core success of Macron's model is empirical: he defeated Marine Le Pen's far-right party in two consecutive presidential run-offs (2017 and 2022). This was achieved by creating a large centrist bloc that attracted voters from both the moderate left and right, effectively re-establishing a version of the traditional front républicain (republican front) against the far right. In this sense, it served as a direct barrier to the presidency.