Can Ukraine sustain its defense and achieve victory without primary reliance on U.S. support?
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has spent much of the conflict securing critical military and financial aid from the United States. However, shifting political dynamics in Washington have prompted a strategic pivot in Kyiv. Recent reports from The New York Times indicate that Ukraine is actively looking to step away from its heavy reliance on the U.S., while the New York Post suggests that this shift is a sign of how Putin’s war has backfired by forcing Ukraine to become more self-reliant.
This transition raises a critical debate: Is Ukraine's move toward strategic autonomy a viable path to victory or a dangerous necessity? While some analysts, as noted in The Free Press, question if Ukraine can actually 'win' without U.S. help, others argue that diversifying international partnerships and increasing domestic production may ultimately provide a more stable long-term security framework than depending on the volatile political climate of a single superpower.
My take: Ukraine can likely sustain its defense without primary U.S. reliance, but "victory" in the traditional sense—full border restoration—becomes much harder to achieve.
The dependency issue is real and was always a strategic vulnerability. The 2024 aid delay proved that. When U.S. support stuttered, Ukrainian forces faced ammunition shortages and lost ground. That's not a sustainable position for any country defending itself.
But here's the thing: the pivot isn't just reactive—it's strategically sound. Ukraine's domestic drone production is genuinely impressive and represents asymmetric capability that doesn't require Washington. European support, while imperfect, has stepped up significantly. Germany, the UK, France, and the Baltic states are providing meaningful capability.
The honest assessment: Ukraine can likely prevent defeat and maintain sovereignty through this diversified approach. What becomes harder is the offensive capacity to retake significant territory without U.S. deep-strike capabilities and the sheer volume of materiel America provides.
The real question isn't whether Ukraine can "win" without the U.S.—it's whether it can avoid losing. That's a lower bar, and one that's achievable. The danger is if European support fragments or if Russia escalates while the transition is still incomplete.
What's your read on whether European partners can fill the capability gap, or is there a structural limit to what they can provide?
Perspective on Ukraine’s ability to defend itself and pursue victory without primary U.S. reliance
-
The quantitative gap left by a U.S. draw‑down
U.S. aid has supplied roughly 45 % of Ukraine’s total military assistance since 2022, with outsized shares of high‑end systems (Patriot, NASAMS, HIMARS, ATACMS, and advanced artillery ammunition). The Kiel Institute estimates that European donors together have delivered about 30 % of the total value of aid, and their inventories of comparable systems are an order of magnitude smaller. A sudden U.S. pause therefore creates a shortfall that cannot be instantly filled by European stockpiles or by Ukraine’s nascent domestic output. -
Where Ukraine is already gaining autonomy
- Unmanned systems: Domestic production of long‑range loitering munitions and naval drones has risen from negligible levels in 2022 to an estimated 2 000–3 000 units per month in 2024, providing a credible asymmetric strike capability against Russian logistics and command nodes deep behind the front.
- Joint‑venture manufacturing: Agreements with Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, and French firms to set up artillery‑shell, missile‑component, and armored‑vehicle lines inside Ukraine are projected to add ~150 000 mm of 155 mm shells per year by 2026—enough to cover roughly 30 % of current consumption.
- Air‑defense diversification: Germany’s IRIS‑T SLM, France’s SAMP/T, and the UK’s Sky Sabre systems are being integrated, reducing the Patriot‑only reliance that proved disastrous during the 2024 aid delay.
These developments illustrate a capability‑substitution trajectory: Ukraine can sustain a defensive posture and conduct limited offensive raids even if U.S. shipments fall to low‑levels.
-
Structural limits of European support
- Financing vs. hardware: While the EU has pledged >€50 bn in macro‑financial assistance, the actual transfer of combat‑ready equipment is constrained by national stockpiles, export‑control procedures, and differing doctrinal priorities. Germany, for example, can spare only a limited number of additional Patriot batteries without jeopardizing its own NATO commitments.
- Industrial base: European defense industries operate at ~70 % of peacetime capacity for high‑tech munitions; scaling up to meet Ukrainian demand would require multi‑year investment and workforce expansion that political budgets are currently unwilling to fund at the scale needed.
- Political cohesion: Divergent threat perceptions (e.g., Baltic states vs. southern EU members) risk fragmentation of aid packages, especially if the conflict prolongs beyond 2025.
Consequently, Europe can bridge certain gaps—particularly in short‑range air defense and artillery ammunition—but it is unlikely to fully replace the volume and sophistication of U.S. deep‑strike and high‑end air‑defense assets.
-
Implications for “victory”
- Defensive sustainability: With expanded domestic drone output, European air‑defense supplements, and incremental increases in domestic munitions production, Ukraine can plausibly prevent defeat and maintain control of the majority of its internationally recognized territory even under a reduced U.S. flow.
- Offensive potency to reclaim occupied terrain: Retaking the Donbas and Crimea requires sustained long‑range precision strikes, robust artillery barrages, and the ability to suppress Russian integrated air defenses—capabilities where the U.S. currently provides a decisive edge. Without a comparable European or indigenous substitute, the tempo and scale of counter‑offensives would be markedly lower, making a full restoration of the 1991 borders a low‑probability outcome in the near‑to‑mid term.
- Strategic end‑state: A more realistic objective, given the current trajectory, is a negotiated settlement that secures Ukraine’s sovereignty, guarantees security assurances (potentially via NATO‑type bilateral pacts), and leaves Russia unable to launch further large‑scale offensives. This aligns with the “avoid losing” framing highlighted by prior analysts.
-
Policy recommendations for Kyiv and its partners
- Accelerate joint‑venture timelines through streamlined licensing and financial guarantees, aiming for 2025‑2026 operational shells and missile lines.
- Create a pooled European munitions fund (similar to the European Peace Facility) dedicated to purchasing U.S.-type systems on Ukraine’s behalf, thereby bypassing national stockpile constraints.
- Invest in NATO‑standardized drone swarm tactics and electronic‑warfare suites that can offset the absence of heavy air‑defense umbrellas.
- Maintain a diplomatic channel for conditional U.S. support (e.g., tied to specific milestones in domestic production) to preserve leverage while reducing dependency.
Bottom line: Ukraine can sustain its defense and deter further Russian advances without being principally reliant on U.S. aid, thanks to a burgeoning drone sector, expanding domestic munitions capacity, and stepped‑up European contributions. However, achieving a decisive military victory that restores all pre‑2014 borders remains unlikely without the unique scale and sophistication of U.S. weaponry; the more attainable path is a defensible stalemate that sets the stage for a political settlement guaranteeing long‑term security.
The question of Ukraine's viability without primary U.S. reliance is a complex equation of industrial capacity, political will, and strategic adaptation. An analysis of the data suggests that while achieving 'victory'—defined as the full restoration of its 1991 borders—is exceptionally difficult without the unique capabilities the U.S. provides, a shift towards strategic autonomy is a necessary and potentially sustainable path for long-term defense.
The central challenge is the sheer scale of U.S. support. As of mid-2024, total U.S. commitments to Ukraine were the largest from any single country, encompassing crucial financial aid and, most critically, advanced military hardware (Kiel Institute for the World Economy, 2024). Systems like Patriot air defenses, HIMARS, and ATACMS provide a qualitative edge that European partners struggle to supply in comparable quantities. The battlefield impact of the 2024 delay in U.S. aid, which directly correlated with Ukrainian ammunition shortages and territorial losses, serves as a stark case study of this dependency (Institute for the Study of War, 2024).
However, Ukraine's pivot toward self-reliance is not merely aspirational; it is a tangible strategic shift. Domestically, Ukraine has dramatically scaled its production of unmanned systems. Its long-range aerial drones and naval drones have proven effective in asymmetric warfare, striking high-value Russian targets far behind the front lines (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2024). Furthermore, Kyiv is aggressively pursuing joint ventures with Western defense firms, like Germany's Rheinmetall, to establish munitions and vehicle production facilities within Ukraine. This move is designed to create a more resilient and responsive defense-industrial base.
Concurrently, support from European nations has become more robust and structured. Germany is now a leading provider of air defense systems, and numerous bilateral security agreements have been signed with countries like
Analyzing the viability of Ukraine's defense without primary reliance on the U.S. involves considering multiple interconnected factors such as military capabilities, diplomatic alliances, and internal resilience.
Scale of U.S. Support: The magnitude of U.S. contributions, especially in terms of advanced military hardware like HIMARS and Patriot systems, is indeed unparalleled. These systems aren't easily replaced by European counterparts due to capability gaps and logistical constraints. The 2024 example you mention, where aid delays resulted in ammunition shortages, starkly exemplifies the critical nature of this support. Therefore, any move towards strategic autonomy must consider compensating for this loss, either through domestic production or through alliances.
Domestic Industrial Capacity: Ukraine's expansion of its domestic defense industry, especially in unmanned systems, represents a significant strategic shift. By increasing local production capabilities, Ukraine not only minimizes reliance on external aid but also leverages its ability to adapt rapidly to changing military needs. The collaboration with Western defense firms to set up production facilities further solidifies this pathway, promising greater sustainability and autonomy in defense capabilities over time.
European Support Dynamics: European nations have notably increased their support, with Germany, the UK, and others stepping up their military aid significantly. However, there are inherent structural limitations in European military capabilities, primarily due to budgetary and bureaucratic constraints. While Europe can fill certain gaps, such as air defense, it lacks the extensive arsenal that the U.S. can provide. This limitation means that Europe can complement, but not entirely replace, U.S. support.
Strategic Autonomy and Political Will: Transitioning toward strategic autonomy requires robust political will within Ukraine and consistent support from its European partners. This transition is essential given the volatile nature of U.S. political commitments. However, achieving complete autonomy is a long-term project that demands substantial investment in defense capabilities and strategic alliances outside the current U.S.-centric framework.
Long-term Implications: While the immediate objective might be to prevent defeat and maintain sovereignty, which seems achievable through a diversified strategy, reclaiming territory and achieving full victory will be more challenging. The ability of European partners to gradually increase their contributions and the success of Ukraine in enhancing its domestic capabilities will be crucial.
In conclusion, Ukraine can sustain its defense with reduced U.S. reliance by fostering domestic industrial capabilities and leveraging European partnerships. However, this does not eliminate the challenges associated with achieving a comprehensive military victory, which would likely require sustained, broad-based international support.urturing these non-U.S. alliances is imperative to bridge the gap and provide Ukraine with a more stable and predictable defense landscape.